E73: Late-stage VC markdowns and mistakes, market strategy, Ukraine/Russia update & more
2022-03-26 spoken.md · speaker-labeled ▶ watch ← E72 all episodes E74 →
Every number here is replayed from score_events — the same ledger the pool ranks on. Decay is what the 97 ideas nobody mentioned gave up this week; it applies only when an episode is processed.
Tier crossings
conviction thresholds crossed by this episode — 65 / 45 / 15 · ideas born here show where they landed. why 65 isn't always green
Who moved the board
each voice's force on conviction this episode — supports and opposes, weighted exactly as the replay applied them · share = % of this episode's movement
What got argued (13 ideas)
ordered by how hard each idea moved · quotes are verbatim from the transcript, timestamps deep-link into the episode
Rates repricing public growth multiples (roughly 15-20% of valuation per 100bp) leaves late-stage private marks badly stale, so they have to come down 30-60% and the vast majority of companies going public in the next 12 months price below their last private round. The late-stage financing market is shut in the meantime — a buyer/seller standoff with no real price discovery until the fall — and the reckoning prices in the recent-IPO and long-duration growth cohort.
the implication of that is that it means that late-stage venture is pretty badly mispriced. ... And I think you're going to have to knock these things back by 50, 60 percent. I think you saw the first real big movement there yesterday, which was the Instacart print, right? We went from a $40 billion valuation to I think it was 24
I think the vast majority of companies that come public in the next 12 months are going out below their last-round valuation.
The multiple compression is survivable for the handful of software businesses compounding fast enough: Snowflake grows free cash flow over 100% this year and 80-90% next, so it grows through a 50% multiple cut in short order. In a flight to quality the 'must-own' high-growth names keep the bid while the nice-to-own long tail gets orphaned.
Snowflake this year will grow its free cash flow at over 100% a year. Next year, probably, you know, 80 or 90% free cash flow, not just revenue, free cash flow. ... That business, so let's say we reduce the multiple by 50%, but the company's growing top line and free cash flow by 100%. Doesn't take you very long to grow through the multiple compression.
Google and Facebook/Instagram are indifferent to the venture funding reset: they guide to numbers and will ratchet ad prices up to hit them, pushing customer-acquisition costs 20-40% higher for everyone downstream. CAC inflation is the transmission channel that kills low-end bottom-up SaaS while the $2T of duopoly market cap holds its own revenue.
most of these businesses that rely on Facebook and Google and Instagram for customer acquisition, those input costs are going up. And the reason you know that is that's $2 trillion of market cap that doesn't give a flying fuck what's happening in startup land. They're going to make their numbers. Right. ... Those are the most important companies in the world. They will ratchet up the prices. And so your input costs are going up. It's not just the physical supply of materials that I think is going up. It's just the cost of customer acquisition is going to probably go up by 20, 30, 40 percent.
Neobanks and consumer-lending fintechs funded at exorbitant valuations are fundamentally an arbitrage on zero rates — take money at 0%, sell it at 1%, keep the spread. At a 2-3% cost of capital the model implodes, so the whole funded neobank/lending cohort comes under pressure.
Neobanks are another example. The number of Neobanks that have been funded at exorbitant valuations, where the problem is all of these financial services companies are essentially an arbitrage on rates. When rates are zero, they take that money at 0% and then they can go and execute a business model and sell that money at 1% and take the difference. But when their cost of capital is 2 or 2.5 or 3%, the whole business implodes on them. So you're going to see a bunch of these financial services companies get under pressure.
If you look at, you know, during the two-year period during COVID, the multiples had risen to some insane level, right? And because of all the liquidity that had been pumped into the system. So as soon as you saw the charts that way, you could just see where things were headed, which is back to historical averages.
the number one question I get from GPs, venture capitalists and others right now is when are we going to bounce back? Let me be absolutely clear. There is no bouncing back to where we were the last 18 months. That was the outlier. That was the make-believe.
We've had this ridiculous culture of no governance, uncapped notes, just pushing. I see it on the boards I'm on. You guys probably see it too. Some people just pushing top line growth, never discussing unique economics, never discussing the bottom line. ... And they created these crazy Fugezi markups. They raised bigger funds based on it. And they just were never the adults in the room, the stewards of capital. It's infuriating.
if you have a bunch of capital allocators, Jason, to your point, who are unsophisticated about investing, probably very sophisticated operationally, but fundamentally don't know what they're doing, and they're coming and transforming an organization that should be a disciplined, discerning allocator of capital and turning them into a velocity deal machine.
Now, here we are again. We're worried about this inflationary boogeyman. And the Chinese government basically extended these tax cuts, increased the tax cuts, and essentially said we're going to be very stimulative in the economy, especially through the back half of the year.
PMI in January came in at 0.2 versus the consensus estimate of 0.6. That means the producer level of inflation was meaningfully less than we expected. ... That's why I think there's also a probability by the middle of the summer, the Fed in the United States is saying we now see a balanced risk between growth and inflation.
So we have this interconnected world, this idea that we're de-globalizing. ... What we do doesn't impact anybody else. That ship has sailed a long time ago, and the Chinese see this.
I tweeted a few weeks ago, the Fed's probably behind the curve on recession, not inflation, right? We have massive demand destruction going on right now in the US economy.
for us in moments like this, and I've lived probably through five of them in the public markets, we always do the same thing. Degross, take risk down. First thing is like have less chits on the board. Number two, reduce the number of outliers. Pull in the risk curve, right? For me, I want to own five or six things, because remember, I'm the biggest LP in the fund.
I'm not betting this way with our book. But if I had to guess, we are going to have a period of significant escalation on both sides before they both get to the table. Macron said this week that we still have the Europeans have not made a decision about the embargo of Russian oil that will collapse the Russian economy. And oil will go to 180 or $200 a barrel. I think that's a real likelihood.
how can the United States be under so much inflationary pressure, where China is effectively telling you that we are in a contraction and a recessionary period. And so if that's where China is, there's a risk that we may already be there or entering that.
Look at what's going on in the world with energy prices. We've never had oil over $120 and not gone into a recession. We're facing a global slowdown. That will have big implications for inflation, big implications for rates.
This fall is when we'll start to see real price discovery. You couldn't pry a late stage dollar out of my hand right now, because I don't think that we have real price discovery going on.
Not because we won't get hit with the same valuation corrections that everybody else is going to suffer, but because a few years ago, we decided we were going to invest in a certain kind of company. I mean, high margin SaaS and marketplace businesses that were not capital intensive. ... And we turned down investments that were growing fast, but they had a horrible burn multiple. And so and I do think most of our companies raised last year when, you know, they made hay while the sun shined.
Episode digest
written during extraction and stored in data/extractions/ep073.json — the auditable source of truth, including everything market-adjacent that did not earn a capture
Friedberg is out (Jason: the Sultan of Science 'can't make it this week') and Brad Gerstner fills in, which turns the first hour into the most concentrated private-markets reckoning the show has done. The new thesis of the episode is a valuation-mechanics one: Chamath reduces Brad's chart to a rule — 'for every hundred basis point increase in rates, you got to downtick that valuation by fifteen to twenty percent' — and concludes late-stage venture is 'pretty badly mispriced' and has to be knocked back 50-60%, with Instacart's self-mark from $40B to $24B and the halved Reddit cover price as receipts. Brad's dated version: 'the vast majority of companies that come public in the next 12 months are going out below their last-round valuation'; Sacks agrees they IPO at down rounds; Jason reads out GoPuff/Canva/Klarna/Discord/Ripple/Grammarly as marks that don't survive contact with public comps. Because `rate-driven-growth-derating-2021` closed on 2022-03-06, three weeks before this taping, this fresh de-rating claim was coined as a new idea with its own stated 12-month window (`late-stage-private-marks-reset-2022`, bearish IPO) rather than dropped or retro-attached. Real disclosed positioning, unusually dense: Brad — 'You couldn't pry a late stage dollar out of my hand right now', the late-stage private financing market 'is closed', 'we're not even 10 or 20 percent of the way into the psychic reset', real price discovery arrives 'this fall'; and on the public book, 'Degross, take risk down… reduce the number of outliers… I want to own five or six things, because remember, I'm the biggest LP in the fund.' Chamath discloses he does not want to put incremental capital into late-stage ('I can just go in the S&P 500 and get 8%') and is 'trying to find good long-term businesses and just kind of close my eyes'; Sacks discloses Craft's book is built for this (high-margin non-capital-intensive SaaS, the burn-multiple screen at <1 amazing / 1-2 good / >3 bad, portfolio companies capping burn multiple at 2 as a governor) and that his companies 'made hay while the sun shined' last year; Sacks also relays that D1 is 'off privates completely' while Tiger is still in market. Reinforced: `risk-capital-golden-era-peaks-2021` (three voices, all as positioning), `qe-end-liquidity-drain` (Sacks on the liquidity-inflated multiples reverting; Brad's flat 'There is no bouncing back to where we were the last 18 months. That was the outlier. That was the make-believe'), and `low-diligence-capital-breeds-fraud-2021` (Chamath's recruiter story — mid-level unicorn execs pick venture jobs on 'how many deals will I be allowed to do per year', turning allocators into a 'velocity deal machine'; Jason's 'crazy Fugezi markups… never the adults in the room'). Two new bull ideas came out of the flight-to-quality thread: Brad's Snowflake call (FCF +100% this year, 80-90% next, so it grows through a 50% multiple cut) with Chamath putting SNOW on his must-own list beside the FANGs, and Chamath's ad-duopoly call — Google/Facebook/Instagram are '$2 trillion of market cap that doesn't give a flying fuck what's happening in startup land', they 'will ratchet up the prices' and CAC goes up 20-40%, which is also the mechanism he says kills low-end bottom-up SaaS. He separately calls the funded neobank cohort a pure rate arbitrage that 'implodes' at a 2-3% cost of capital (new: `rate-squeeze-breaks-neobanks-2022`). On macro the E61 board took real damage: Brad opposes `us-boom-2022` with receipts ('the Fed's probably behind the curve on recession, not inflation… massive demand destruction going on right now', PMI 0.2 vs 0.6 consensus, consumer confidence in one of its four biggest 20-year drawdowns, mortgage buying power down from a $350K house to $295K in four months) and calls a global slowdown ('We've never had oil over $120 and not gone into a recession'), with Chamath reading China's tax-cut stimulus as an admission of contraction and Sacks flagging war-driven US recession risk. Brad simultaneously supports `inflation-fades-breakevens-2021` — he does not believe in global stagflation or hyperinflation and sees a probability the Fed says 'balanced risk between growth and inflation' by mid-summer — and trashes the reshoring thesis on its last live day: 'this idea that we're de-globalizing… That ship has sailed a long time ago.' Chamath's own `tech-drawdown-eighth-inning-2022` bottom call got a soft reaffirmation ('markets are mostly moving upwards for the short term and then volatility is going to come back') against Brad's de-grossing, which is the cleanest cross-voice disagreement in the episode. Ukraine: Sacks runs the lead-not-bleed thesis (the three-piece peace deal is known, Washington wants Russia to bleed out Afghanistan-style, quoting Niall Ferguson and the RAND study), Brad names the 'Blinken doctrine' of overwhelming economic force and predicts escalation before negotiation with a complete European embargo of 3M bbl/day taking oil to $180-200 — explicitly flagged as not his book — which is the only tradeable Ukraine capture and lands on `global-conflict-energy-defense`. Nothing on crypto, SPACs, battery metals or Visa/Mastercard this week. Label anomaly: only four labels exist (Jason 116, Chamath 76, Sacks 60, Brad 44) and Friedberg has zero — legitimately absent, but he dials in from a car at 1:05:22 and that single turn ('Gas-gathering car, SUV in the mountains') is labelled Brad Gerstner; the following 'I only use ethanol. I make in vats in my backyard' at 1:05:31 (labelled Chamath) may also be his. Both are banter, so no capture is affected.