E165: Vision Pro: use or lose? Meta vs Snap, SaaS recovery, AI investing, rolling real estate crisis
2024-02-09 spoken.md · speaker-labeled ▶ watch ← E164 all episodes E166 →
Every number here is replayed from score_events — the same ledger the pool ranks on. Decay is what the 109 ideas nobody mentioned gave up this week; it applies only when an episode is processed.
Tier crossings
conviction thresholds crossed by this episode — 65 / 45 / 15 · ideas born here show where they landed. why 65 isn't always green
Who moved the board
each voice's force on conviction this episode — supports and opposes, weighted exactly as the replay applied them · share = % of this episode's movement
What got argued (17 ideas)
ordered by how hard each idea moved · quotes are verbatim from the transcript, timestamps deep-link into the episode
Evan Spiegel's ~99% voting control leaves common shareholders with no feedback loop, so activists and serious analysts don't bother and the company never gets forced to fix itself: revenue is flat 2021-2023 while opex grew a billion a year, the 10% headcount cut is too little too late (a 25% cut is what the math needs), and 2023 stock-based comp of $1.3B against $35M of free cash flow diluted shares 4% in one year. The governance defect, not demand, is why the stock stays broken.
I think that case studies had been written about how tilted the governance is in SNAP. I think the point is that they basically have infinite to zero voting power over common shareholders, so there's no real feedback loop, and I think that that has probably adversely affected the types of people that traffic in their stock.
I guess Zuckerberg has 60% of voting control, whereas Evan Spiegel has 99%. So Snap is more egregious. The difference is that Zuckerberg is listening and Spiegel is not. The reason why Snap is doing poorly is not because its revenue has deteriorated... if you look at operating expenses, they went from 3 billion to 4 billion a year. And that is why their operating income or operating loss went from a $700 million loss to a $1.4 billion loss in two years.
So they generated $35 million of free cash, and they used $1.3 billion to compensate employees beyond their OPEX. So that means that they paid employees 40 times the free cash flow that was generated for shareholders during the year, which is also equivalent to 10% of the enterprise market value of this company.
Meta at ~25x free cash flow is not a demanding multiple given $71B of operating cash flow, a 22% headcount cut, $20B of buybacks that shrank the share count, and the first dividend. On top of that base the besties argue you get unpriced option value: 3.2B daily users, infrastructure that can be leveraged AWS-style into cloud and third-party AI tooling, the #2 ad platform in the world, and the balance sheet to go big in AI where profitability is the entry ticket. The AI-driven recovery of the ad targeting lost to Apple's ATT is the proof the engineering can convert.
You get all this option value at Meta, which you don't get at Snap. There's all this infrastructure that they can leverage, much like Amazon did with AWS, into things like cloud, AI tools for third-party developers, third-party applications. And then obviously, Meta is the biggest advertising platform next to Google in the world now.
Friedberg's sizing: Common Crawl, the backbone of GPT-3's training mix, is roughly 10 petabytes, while YouTube holds an estimated 2,000-3,000 petabytes growing 1-2 petabytes a day - about 300x bigger, and it is video, image, audio and text rather than scraped text alone. If model quality converges once everyone trains on the open internet, the only remaining edge is a corpus nobody can license, and Google's is the biggest that exists (plus Gmail and Docs as private-data reserves). Conditional on Google actually shipping, that makes it the most valuable asset in the world under the data-moat thesis.
which makes YouTube data repository 300 times larger than Common Crawl, which makes it bigger than anything else that anyone else has... if Google gets its act together and leverages the data repository at YouTube, it is an insurmountable moat that will only continue to extend because the quality of the YouTube experience and the network effects continue to accumulate for them. So I think it's the most valuable asset in the world today based on this thesis that AI value is going to accrue to the data owner.
And this is where, going back to my speculation a couple months ago, kind of gets revisited, if you're actually talking about a two-third write-down on the value in these funds, most of that being pension funds, you're not going to see governments let that happen. You're going to see the federal government. There's going to be some action at some point... there's going to need to be some sort of structured solution to support retirees and pensioners, because that's ultimately who ends up holding the bag in this massive write-down.
I've always felt like when Apple comes into the race, that's the starter's pistol. And I think this is it because I've heard the same thing from everybody. You have to try it. It feels like different than Oculus and some of those versions that came out previously. And they have the app ecosystem.
Yeah, it's definitely like buying a new computing device, but people felt the same way about the iPad... I think they're going to sell $100 billion of Apple Vision Pros. Not this version, but this version plus the next version probably over the next. I would guess for them to get to $100 billion in sales, it'll take them less than five years.
Is that we've re-baselined these businesses. So now what would have looked like just a massive miss over the last two years now looks like a beat because we've just completely reset expectations. Is it that or is it that the economy is actually expanding and we can count on some reasonable growth rates?
But now we're seeing quarter over quarter growth. So growth is re-accelerating. Growth is higher than it was. So is it going to get to where it was? That probably will take some time, but it feels like the problems in the ecosystem work themselves out, and now we're back to growth again.
With the market ripping, and you now got a really efficient company, you're like, hey, can we spend a little bit on SaaS to make the remaining employees even more productive? OK, maybe that's a reasonable discussion. And then people are playing ball in terms of negotiating prices.
Sacks' counter to model commoditization: consumer AI is winner-take-most like search, and OpenAI only has to stay marginally ahead of open source to keep it. Hundreds of millions of ChatGPT consumers make it the audience developers want to reach, custom GPTs are far easier than fine-tuning an open model, and each custom GPT adds capability back to ChatGPT - a classic operating-system developer flywheel open source cannot easily copy. Enterprise licences and team workspaces convert the consumer habit into paid seats. The listed expression is Microsoft, OpenAI's compute and distribution partner.
So you have a classic developer network effect where you've got OpenAI aggregating hundreds of millions of consumers because they perceive that chat GPT is the best. Then you've got developers wanting to reach that audience. So they build custom GPTs on the OpenAI platform. That actually gives chat GPT more capability. And that's something that open source can't easily catch up with.
OpenAI is three different businesses. OpenAI has a closed model that's trained on the open Internet. I think economically it's going to be very hard to sustain that unless they start buying all number of apps so that they can get some fine tunes that they control that are proprietary to them... I think they're all going to converge to the same quality in the next probably 12 to 18 months.
Jason's framing of the other side of the real-estate story: while office sits in massive oversupply with no demand, single-family housing is roughly 7 million units short with demand off the charts, which is an incredible market for developers. Sacks pushes back that residential is not a good market either because financing costs, not vacancy, are the binding constraint.
I keep trying to explain residential is not a great market either because interest rates have spiked up. So there's not a vacancy problem. Multifamily developers are still able to lease the units. They're still able to rent. The problem is their financing costs have shot through the roof.
The problem now is that an engineer can be hired to build the replacement, and so it creates price compression. So the SaaS company can no longer capture that much value, because the savings is actually less than that, because the enterprise might say, hey, I'm going to hire someone, and instead of spending $60,000 a year on your software, I'm going to allocate a quarter of an engineer's time to build that software, and it's going to replace that cost.
The perfect analogy of EC2 and S3 in 2024 is the token per second provider. Now, there you have to double click and say, OK, well, what does a token per second provider need to do to make a lot of money? And I think the ultimate answer is you need your own proprietary hardware.
So I would say that there's a huge amount of equity that's been written off. But in addition to that, there's a lot of debt holders who are in trouble too. And that debt is held by regional banks. So these commercial loan portfolios are significantly impaired. That's what we saw with Community Bank of New York is that their stock cratered when they reported higher than expected losses in their commercial real estate portfolio.
Chamath concedes Vision Pro will be a revenue success but argues the returns are the same if you skip Apple and buy the consequences: if ever-more-immersive computing keeps correlating with youth depression, SSRI and cannabis use, and collapsing marriage and birth rates, then the antidepressant makers, cannabis names and dating apps get the same economics as being long the device maker. Explicitly framed by him as a spread trade.
Not to say that it's not going to be a revenue generator, but I think that you could just as easily, frankly, instead of impacting Apple's revenues, you can probably go along the makers of SSRIs, pot, here comes a spread trade, pot, Bumble and Tinder, and you'll get to the same place economically.
And then what I'm hearing from a lot of executives is cutting these highly stock comped executives who also have big cash comp, cutting them, putting lieutenants in charge, and then moving more jobs to other locations where people don't expect stock based comp... So as everybody optimizes these businesses, I mean, Facebook even did a dividend.
I think foundational models will have no economic value. I think that they will be an incredibly powerful part of the substrate, and they will be broadly available and entirely free... But I think open source models will basically crush the value of models to zero economically, even though the utility will go to infinity, the economic value will go to zero.
Most of the tests show that OpenAI is still ahead of the open source models. I think even people in the open source movement will tell you that OpenAI is, call it six months ahead... Nonetheless, if OpenAI just maintains a little bit of a lead over open source, then it could... It could basically win the vast majority of the call it consumer search or consumer GPT market.
That's why even categories like multifamily, where you don't have a vacancy problem, there's strong demand, those properties still don't make sense... But for all the people who are refinancing now, who are coming up this year, last year, next year, they're in deep trouble. And that's why there's a rolling crisis in real estate, is because the debt rolls over time. It's not like everybody hits the wall and has to refinance at the same time.
Episode digest
written during extraction and stored in data/extractions/ep165.json — the auditable source of truth, including everything market-adjacent that did not earn a capture
Four segments, all tradeable. On Vision Pro, Friedberg flips fully bullish off hands-on enterprise use ($100B of units inside five years, 'everyone's underestimating this as a new computing platform') and Jason takes the over, while Sacks - the original proposer of the E129 next-compute-platform idea - walks his own near-term claim back to 'proof of concept, not a mass market device', and Chamath concedes the revenue but reframes the whole thing as a societal cost, half-seriously pitching a spread trade long SSRI makers, pot, Bumble and Tinder instead of long Apple. The Meta-vs-Snap teardown is the meat: Chamath blames Snap's 99% super-voting control for killing the shareholder feedback loop, Sacks shows revenue flat while opex grew $1B a year, and Friedberg shows Snap paying employees 40x its free cash flow in stock (4% dilution) against Meta buying back $20B and shrinking its share count at 25x FCF with unpriced AI option value - so I coined a bearish SNAP idea and a bullish META idea (note: SNAP's thesis is the 2024 re-birth of the closed E101 `zero-vote-governance-orphans-snap-2022`, and the OpenAI idea is the re-birth of the closed E110 `openai-ascendance-2023`). Sacks restates his software-recession-is-over call with Q4 cloud and Atlassian net-new-ARR data (Chamath objects that it's just re-baselined expectations), while Friedberg reaffirms the build-vs-buy price-compression thesis. Biggest AI capture: Chamath now argues foundation models go to zero economic value - crossing to the side of Friedberg's E129 open-source-commoditization idea that he originally opposed - while Sacks argues the opposite via OpenAI's custom-GPT developer flywheel, and Friedberg sizes YouTube at ~300x Common Crawl as Google's insurmountable data moat (nested as a sub-idea under Chamath's proprietary-data moat). Real estate closes it: Friedberg reaffirms his federal-CRE-rescue bet off Sternlicht's $3T-to-$1.8T office mark, Sacks reaffirms both the multifamily refi crisis and his own 2024 regional-banks-fragile prediction with NYCB as the receipt.